

The Secret Side of International Politics

PLSC 29202

Fall 2019

Time: Tuesdays & Thursdays, 12:30 – 1:50pm

Room: 5727 S. University Ave., Room 112

Professor: Austin Carson, Department of Political Science, acarson@uchicago.edu

TAs: Andres Uribe (uribe@uchicago.edu) and Diana Wueger (dwueger@uchicago.edu)

Office Hours: Tuesdays, 2:30-4:00pm (Pick Hall 428). *Sign up for a 15 minute slot at my website:* <https://austinmcarson.com/teaching/>

Course description

This course introduces students to the secret side of international politics. The class meets twice per week and uses a lecture/lab model. A weekly lecture with discussion will address readings that survey a range of theoretical approaches to understanding secrecy in international politics. In doing so we will analyze secrecy's role in intelligence analysis, alliances, crisis decision-making, and wartime military operations, and other domains. Questions the material addresses include: Why do diplomats value secrecy so much when negotiating? What purposes beyond operational security does secrecy serve in wartime? Why do governments and non-actors cooperate in secret and what do those partnerships look like? How does intelligence analysis conducted in secret fail? What impact does secrecy have on international norms, laws, and order? Student must write an original research paper that draws on declassified primary materials. A series of assignments during the quarter build up to the final paper and students' progress will be facilitated by weekly "lab" meetings with the instructor and teaching assistants which provide guidance on the research and writing process. This course is intended for advanced undergraduates (political science majors and non-majors welcome) with an appetite for a large reading load and a challenging paper assignment.

Books for purchase

Acquire these books as soon as possible. Some may be at the Seminary Co-Op Bookstore but all are available online. Double check for correct editions via the ISBN number.

Bok, Sissela. *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation*. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. ISBN 978-0679724735

Carson, Austin. *Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics*. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0691181769

Goffman, Erving. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1959. ISBN 9780385094023

Gusterson, Hugh. *Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War*. University of California Press, 1996. ISBN 9780520213739

May, Ernest R., and Philip Zelikow. *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*. W. W. Norton & Company, 2002. ISBN 9780393322590

O'Rourke, Lindsey A. *Covert Regime Change: America's Secret Cold War*. Cornell University Press, 2018. ISBN 978-1501730658
Rovner, Joshua. *Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence*. Cornell University Press, 2011. ISBN 978-1501700736
Zegart, Amy B. *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11*. Princeton University Press, 2009. ISBN 978-0691141039

Requirements

Students are expected to attend every session and complete the required readings. The class grade is based on reading assessments and a final research paper.

Reading assessments (30%). Students will be graded on short reading assessments during lab each week. These are basically quizzes. Each will feature a handful of multiple choice or short answer questions, to be answered in less than ten minutes, which cover the full scope of required readings. The questions will be carefully designed to be very easy for students who do the reading and tough for those who skip any. Each student's lowest score will be dropped at end of quarter. No assessments will take place for Weeks 9 and 10.

Original research paper (70%). Students must write an original research paper that draws at least in part on originally classified or otherwise unavailable primary government documents. Two basic paper types exist. One uses previously unavailable materials to reanalyze an important historical event and shed new light on some aspect of it. Secrecy per se may play a minor or no role in this event. The second kind of paper analyzes an explicitly secret government activity or program (i.e. covert operation; secret peace negotiations) with documents now available to shed light on some aspect of it. Either form requires making an argument, not just presenting new material. Whichever you choose, the goal is for students to get hands-on experience doing qualitative historical research using archival data sources. The research paper grade is decomposed into the following:

- Topic proposal and research question (Wk 3) (5%)
- Data and conventional wisdom summary (Wk 4) (5%)
- One para summary and outline (Wk 5) (5%)
- Five pages swap, including feedback to partner (Wk 8) (5%)
- Final research paper (finals week) (50%)
- TOTAL: 70% of course grade

Extra credit (up to +5%). Students interested in extra credit can participate in an ongoing research project on the President's Daily Brief. I will provide details during the quarter about options here.

Professionalism

We will create our own quarter-long intellectual community. Its norms will be collectively generated and honed over time. My goal is for all of us to feel comfortable developing and scrutinizing one another's ideas. To allow this, students must follow basic norms of respectful intellectual exchange. Be professional in all communications. Emails should be thoughtfully composed with normal punctuation and salutations. Comments in class should be respectful of other students. Avoid adopting a confrontational tone. Respectfully disagree by suggesting a different view rather than forcefully contradicting. To create and sustain an open environment, acts of sexual misconduct, which encompass a range of conduct from sexual assault to sexual harassment, will be treated as violations of the standards of our community and unacceptable.

Other forms of misconduct based on race, religion, or sexual orientation are equally unacceptable. A new and useful university resource on gender-based misconduct is [here](#).

Email policy

Note that in general I do not read or respond to student emails until the evening or next morning. On weekends, I often do not read/respond at all. Please do not expect immediate replies.

Late policy

All deadlines are strict. Papers/assignments received late will be dropped one letter grade for each 24 hours past the deadline.

Make-up exam policy

If the course has an exam, students may have to miss the regular exam date because of illness or other excusable reasons. Students may take a make-up exam only after receiving permission from me in writing before the regular exam. To do so, students must submit a request by email to me, any TA, and your college adviser.

Academic integrity

I will strictly follow the University's policy on academic integrity: "It is contrary to justice, academic integrity, and to the spirit of intellectual inquiry to submit another's statements or ideas as one's own work." More details on the policy are [here](#).

Disability accommodations

If you need any special accommodations, please provide me with a copy of an Accommodation Determination Letter (provided to you by the Student Disability Services office) as soon as possible so that you may discuss with him/her how your accommodations may be implemented in this course.

Schedule and Readings

Week 1 (10/1/19). Overview

We will review the syllabus and learn about the course's major assignment: the research paper. I will give a short lecture on two contrasting approaches to secrecy building on the assigned readings by Fearon & Colson. I will also review key points on archival research and theoretical inferences from Larson and Kapiszewski, et al.

Suggested readings (no required readings this session)

Fearon, James D. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 379–414. [marked sections in PDF on Canvas most relevant]

Colson, Aurélien. "The Ambassador Between Light and Shade: The Emergence of Secrecy as the Norm for International Negotiation." *International Negotiation* 13, no. 2 (2008): 179–95. [marked sections in PDF on Canvas most relevant]

**Larson, Deborah Welch. "Sources and Methods in Cold War History: The Need for a New Theory-Based Archival Approach." In Elman, Colin, and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds. *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations*. MIT Press, 2001.

**To be discussed in Lab.

Supplemental reading (archival research)

Trachtenberg, Marc. *The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2006.

Diana Kapiszewski, et al. "Thinking Outside the (Archive) Box: Discovering Data in the Field." In Kapiszewski, Diana, Lauren M. MacLean, and Benjamin L. Read. *Field Research in Political Science: Practices and Principles*. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Lustick, Ian S. "History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias." *The American Political Science Review* 90.3 (1996): 605-618.

Darnton, Christopher. "Archives and Inference: Documentary Evidence in Case Study Research and the Debate over US Entry into World War II." *International Security* 42.3 (2018): 84-126.

Hughes, R. Gerald, Peter Jackson, and Len Scott. *Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State*. Routledge, 2008.

Elman, Colin, and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds. *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations*. MIT Press, 2001.

Elman, Colin, and Diana Kapiszewski. "Data Access and Research Transparency in the Qualitative Tradition." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 47.1 (2014): 43-47.

Tesar, Marek. "Ethics and Truth in Archival Research." *History of Education* 44.1 (2015): 101-114.

Week 1 (10/5/19). Lab

Week 2 (10/8/19). Secrets among Friends

This week analyzes secrecy in cooperative partnerships. We review four recently published or forthcoming readings which unpack why secrecy is valuable for allies and partners, what message secrecy sends, and the consequences of such secrecy for the risk of war.

Required reading

Bas, Muhammet, and Robert Schub. "Mutual Optimism as a Cause of Conflict: Secret Alliances and Conflict Onset." *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 552–64.

Koremenos, Barbara and Melissa Carlson. "Cooperation Failure or Informal Cooperation? Explaining Low Levels of Formal Cooperation between Absolute Monarchies." *Review of International Organizations*, forthcoming.

Brown, Jonathan N., Danielle L. Lupton, and Alex Farrington. "Embedded Deception: Interpersonal Trust, Cooperative Expectations, and the Sharing of Fabricated Intelligence." *Journal of Global Security Studies* 4.2 (2018): 209-226.

Supplemental reading

Brown, Jonathan N. "The Sound of Silence: Power, Secrecy, and International Audiences in US Military Basing Negotiations." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31.4 (2014): 406-431.

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (3): 427–39.

Ritter, Jeffrey. "'Silent Partners' and Other Essays on Alliance Politics." Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, 2004.

Kuo, Raymond. "Secrecy among Friends: Covert Military Alliances and Portfolio Consistency." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2019.

McManus, Roseanne W., and Keren Yarhi-Milo. "The Logic of 'Offstage' Signaling: Domestic Politics, Regime Type, and Major Power-Protégé Relations." *International Organization* 71, no. 4 (2017): 701–33.

Week 2 (10/12/19). Lab

Week 3 (10/15/19). Secret Defense Societies

This week expands on the sociological approach to secrecy introduced in Week 1 (Colson). Readings this week focus on secrecy's tendency to create unique cultures, alter organizations, and shape individuals' identities. We analyze this in the context of national security institutions, such as a nuclear weapons lab. Yet the insights are broader, applying to secrecy in any organizational or social setting. The technique of ethnography – rarely used in political science and especially International Relations – is also featured.

Required reading

- Bok, Sissela. *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation*. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. Chapter IV.
- Cohn, Carol. "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals." *Signs* 12, no. 4 (Summer 1987): 687–718.
- Gusterson, Hugh. *Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War*. University of California Press, 1996. Chapters 1, 3, 4, 6.
- Hurlburt, Heather, Elizabeth Weingarten, Alexandra Stark, and Elena Souris. "The '[Consensual Straitjacket](#)': Four Decades of Women in Nuclear Security." *New America*, March 2019. [Read Part II]

Supplemental reading

- Costas, Jana, and Christopher Grey. "Bringing Secrecy into the Open: Towards a Theorization of the Social Processes of Organizational Secrecy." *Organization Studies* 35, no. 10 (October 1, 2014): 1423–47.
- Erickson, Bonnie H. "Secret Societies and Social Structure." *Social Forces* 60, no. 1 (September 1, 1981): 188–210.
- Tefft, Stanton K, ed. *Secrecy, a Cross-Cultural Perspective*. New York, N.Y.: Human Sciences Press, 1980.
- Masco, Joseph. *The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico*. Princeton University Press, 2006.
- Gibson, David R. "Enduring illusions: The social organization of secrecy and deception." *Sociological Theory* 32.4 (2014): 283-306.
- Kinsella, Helen M. "Sex as the secret: counterinsurgency in Afghanistan." *International Theory* 11.1 (2019): 26-47.

Week 3 (10/17/19). Lab

****Topic proposal and research question due Friday, October 18****

****Email to your TA****

Week 4 (10/22/19). Secrecy, Psychology, and Crisis Decision-Making

This week shifts the focus to psychology and secrecy in decision-making during foreign policy crises. The readings introduce several hypotheses from psychology that may be affected by close-door decision-making or diplomacy. Key ideas include how storytelling shapes perceptions during a decision, the role of accountability in changing how individuals and groups assesses issues, and factors influencing the “integrative complexity” of foreign policy thinking. Note that some of this material is not explicitly about secrecy so students should come prepared to connect readings to it themselves.

Required reading

- May, Ernest R., and Philip Zelikow. *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*. W. W. Norton & Company, 2002. October 18, 19, and 20, 1962 (pp. 73-137).
- Guttieri, Karen, Michael D. Wallace, and Peter Suedfeld. “The Integrative Complexity of American Decision Makers in The Cuban Missile Crisis.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39, no. 4 (December 1, 1995): 595–621.
- Gibson, David R. “Avoiding Catastrophe: The Interactional Production of Possibility during the Cuban Missile Crisis.” *American Journal of Sociology* 117, no. 2 (2011): 361–419. [Read “Introduction,” “Narrating the Future,” pp. 372-392, “Discussion”]
- Lerner, Jennifer and Philip Tetlock. "Accounting for the Effects of Accountability." *Psychological Bulletin* 125.2 (1999): 255-275.

Supplemental reading

- Saunders, Elizabeth N. “War and the Inner Circle: Democratic Elites and the Politics of Using Force.” *Security Studies* 24, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 466–501.
- Johnson, Loch K. "Covert Action and Accountability: Decision-Making for America's Secret Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 33.1 (1989): 81-109.
- Chambers, Simone. "Behind Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 12.4 (2004): 389-410.
- Smith, Steve. “Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission.” *British Journal of Political Science* 15, no. 1 (January 1985): 117–23.

Week 4 (10/24/19). Lab

****Data and conventional wisdom summary due Friday, October 25****
****Email to your TA****

Week 5 (10/29/19). Secrets and Domestic Politics

Previous weeks suggest domestic politics and democracy affect secrecy in international politics. These readings feature recent work that analyzes how secrecy can help leaders cope with tension between international goals and domestic constraints, or what Putnam calls “two-level games.” It also reviews public opinion regarding secrecy in foreign policy and the dilemmas for democratic oversight that secrecy can create.

Skim for background

Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-460.

Required reading

- Bok, Sissela. *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation*. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. Chapter XII.
- Myrick, Rachel. "Why So Secretive? Unpacking Public Attitudes Towards Secrecy and Success in US Foreign Policy." Forthcoming, *The Journal of Politics* (2019).
- Bell, Sam R., and Carla Martinez Machain. “Democracy, Transparency, and Secrecy in Crisis.” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2018.
- Brown, Jonathan N., and Anthony S. Marcum. “Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy.” *Security Studies* 20 (April 2011): 141–70.

Supplemental reading

- Gibbs, David N. "Secrecy and International Relations." *Journal of Peace Research* 32.2 (1995): 213-228.
- Kurizaki, Shuhei. “Efficient Secrecy: Public Versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy.” *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 03 (2007): 543–58.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Zachary C. Steinert-Threlkeld, and David G. Victor. “Predictability versus Flexibility: Secrecy in International Investment Arbitration.” *World Politics* 68, no. 3 (June 23, 2016): 413–53.
- Spaniel, William, and Michael Poznansky. “Credible Commitment in Covert Affairs.” *American Journal of Political Science* 62, no. 3 (2018): 668–681.
- Colaresi, Michael P. *Democracy Declassified: The Secrecy Dilemma in National Security*. Oxford University Press, USA, 2014.
- Stasavage, David. “Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining.” *International Organization* 58, no. 04 (2004): 667–703.
- Yarhi-Milo, Keren. “Tying Hands Behind Closed Doors: The Logic and Practice of Secret Reassurance.” *Security Studies* 22, no. 3 (2013): 405–35.
- Smith, Gregory L. "Secret but Constrained: The Impact of Elite Opposition on Covert Operations." *International Organization* 73.3 (2019): 685-707.

Week 5 (10/31/19). Lab

****One paragraph summary and outline due by Friday, November 1****

****Email to your TA****

Week 6 (11/5/19). Secrecy and the Liberal International Order

Often we seek to understand the causes or consequences of secrecy for discrete events or decisions (e.g. Week 4). This week zooms out to assess the aggregate effect of secrecy and covert state behavior on the rules of the road in the modern international system. How does hiding violations of international law or norms affect those rule systems? How does creation of new rules incentivize secret behavior? How does the likelihood of being exposed for norm violations affect the likelihood of violations? And what is the impact on broader international law when leaders refuse to acknowledge exposed secret activity?

Required reading

- Carnegie, Allison, and Austin Carson. "The Spotlight's Harsh Glare: Rethinking Publicity and International Order." *International Organization* 72, no. 3 (2018): 627–57.
- Poznansky, Michael. "Feigning Compliance: Covert Action and International Law." *International Studies Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (2019): 72–84.
- Perina, Alexandra H. "Black Holes and Open Secrets: The Impact of Covert Action on International Law." *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 53 (2015 2014): 507.
- Krcmaric, Daniel. "Information, Secrecy, and Civilian Targeting." *International Studies Quarterly* 63, no. 2 (2019): 322–33.

Supplemental reading

- Bjola, Corneliu, and Stuart Murray, eds. *Secret Diplomacy: Concepts, Contexts and Cases*. Routledge, 2016.
- Sulmasy, Glenn, and John Yoo. "Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law." *Mich. J. Int'l L.* 28 (2006): 625.
- Colson, Aurélien. "The Ambassador Between Light and Shade: The Emergence of Secrecy as the Norm for International Negotiation." *International Negotiation* 13, no. 2 (2008): 179–95.

Week 6 (11/7/19). Lab

Week 7 (11/12/19). Secrecy, Surveillance, and Satellites

This week's material draws on work in Science and Technology Studies and political geography to think about the politics of satellite images. Since the invention of flight, overhead imagery has been an important intelligence collection technique. We focus on the implications of commercial satellite imagery. Satellite imagery is an especially powerful tool that, until recently, was under the exclusive control of sovereign states. Now it is not. What are the implications of the rise of commercial satellite imagery? How has it affected diplomacy? What are the politics surrounding a space-based gaze?

Required reading

Perkins, Chris, and Martin Dodge. "Satellite Imagery and the Spectacle of Secret Spaces."

Geoforum 40, no. 4 (July 2009): 546–60.

Larkin, Sean P. "The Age of Transparency: International Relations without Secrets."

Foreign Affairs 95 (2016): 136-146.

Witjes, Nina, and Philipp Olbrich. "A Fragile Transparency: Satellite Imagery Analysis,

Non-State Actors, and Visual Representations of Security." Science and Public Policy 44, no. 4 (August 1, 2017): 524–34.

Livingston, Steven, and W. Lucas Robinson. "Mapping fears: the use of commercial high-

resolution satellite imagery in international affairs." Astropolitics 1.2 (2003): 3-25.

Read each of the following news stories:

- Satellite imagery and Rohingya razing ([here](#))
- Satellite imagery and North Korea circumvention ([here](#))
- India and Pakistan cross-border crisis of 2019 ([here](#))
- Russia and doctored MH-17 satellite images ([here](#))

Supplemental reading

Herscher, Andrew. "Surveillant witnessing: Satellite imagery and the visual politics of human rights." Public Culture 26.3 (74) (2014): 469-500.

Shim, David. "Remote Sensing Place: Satellite Images as Visual Spatial Imaginaries."

Geoforum 51 (January 1, 2014): 152–60.

Rothe, Delf, and David Shim. "Sensing the ground: On the global politics of satellite-based

activism." Review of International Studies 44.3 (2018): 414-437.

Peckham, Robert, and Ria Sinha. "Satellites and the new war on infection: tracking Ebola in West Africa." Geoforum 80 (2017): 24-38.

Week 7 (11/14/19). Lab

Week 8 (11/19/19). Intelligence Failure

States use secrecy to gather information and to execute covert operations but often make mistakes. Why? Picking up where last week left off (secrecy and surveillance), this week focuses on intelligence analysis and covert operations. Readings include highlights from the cottage industry on intelligence analysis failures. This will include case studies of some of the most infamous events in modern U.S. history, such as the Vietnam War and 9/11. We will also read new work by O'Rourke on the mistake-prone practice of covert regime change. An important theme this week is bureaucratic dysfunction but other reasons for failure will be introduced.

Guest lecture: Diana Wueger and Andres Uribe

Required reading

- Betts, Richard K. "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable." *World Politics* 31, no. 1 (1978): 61–89.
- O'Rourke, Lindsey A. *Covert Regime Change: America's Secret Cold War*. Cornell University Press, 2018. Chapters 1, 4, 5.
- Rovner, Joshua. *Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence*. Cornell University Press, 2011. Chapters 2, 3, 4.
- Zegart, Amy B. *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11*. Princeton University Press, 2009. Chapters 1, 5, 6.

Supplemental reading

- Jervis, Robert. *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War*. Cornell University Press, 2011. Chapters 1, 3 and 4.
- Yarhi-Milo, Keren. *Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations*. Princeton University Press, 2014.
- Yarhi-Milo, Keren. "In the eye of the beholder: How leaders and intelligence communities assess the intentions of adversaries." *International Security* 38.1 (2013): 7-51.
- Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali. "Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Intelligence and National Security* 13, no. 3 (September 1, 1998): 64–87.
- Bar-Joseph, Uri. "The politicization of intelligence: A comparative study." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 26.2 (2013): 347-369.
- Karam, Jeffrey G. "Missing revolution: the American intelligence failure in Iraq, 1958." *Intelligence and National Security* 32.6 (2017): 693-709.
- Davies, Philip HJ. "Intelligence culture and intelligence failure in Britain and the United States." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17.3 (2004): 495-520.

Week 8 (11/21/19). Lab

****Swap five pages of drafting with your partner by Friday, November 22****

****Email to your TA****

Week 9 (11/26/19). Wartime Secrecy

This week focuses on the operational vs. political role of secrecy during war. We start with reviewing how secrecy and deception are critical to the success of military operations, keeping one's adversary in the dark and off-balance. Secrecy here part of a competitive information game adversaries play, dramatized by the secrecy used toward the end of World War II. We then flip the script, focusing on secrecy's role in the shared limitation of war by adversaries. My own work analyzes the rise of covert military intervention as a tool to enable competition while avoiding escalatory spirals during war. Applications to the Korean War and Vietnam War are reviewed.

Required reading

- Bok, Sissela. *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation*. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. Chapter XIII.
- Lindsey, David. "Military Strategy, Private Information, and War." *International Studies Quarterly* 59.4 (2015): 629-640. [skim mathematical model, read the rest]
- Holt, Thaddeus. *The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War*. Scribner, 2004. Chapters 2, 13. [on Canvas]
- Goffman, Erving. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1959. Chapters TBD.
- Carson, Austin. *Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics*. Princeton University Press. 2018. Chapters 2, 5, 6.

Supplemental reading

- Axelrod, Robert. "The Rational Timing of Surprise." *World Politics* 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 228-46.
- Betts, Richard K. "Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed." *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 4 (1981): 551-72.
- Betts, Richard K. *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1982.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. "Feigning Weakness." *International Organization* 64, no. 3 (2010): 357-88.
- Carson, Austin. "Facing Off and Saving Face: Covert Intervention and Escalation Management in the Korean War." *International Organization* 70.1 (2016): 103-131.

Week 9 (11/28/19). NO LAB – THANKSGIVING

Week 10 (12/3/19). Ending Secrecy: Disclosure and Acknowledgement

This week pivots to the death of secrecy in the form of information disclosure and the related issue of political acknowledgement. It describes kinds of disclosure, including leaks and intentional releases. It also analyzes how governments react to disclosures, including denials and acknowledgment.

Required reading

Bok, Sissela. *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation*. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. Chapter VI, VIII.

Pozen, David E. "The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condone Unlawful Disclosures of Information." *Harvard L. Rev.* 127 (2013): 512-635. [Sections I and II only]

Aldrich, Richard J., and Christopher R. Moran. "'Delayed Disclosure': National Security, Whistle-Blowers and the Nature of Secrecy." *Political Studies* 67.2 (2019): 291-306.

Short case studies

- Scott Shane. "[Documents in Plain Sight, but Still Classified.](#)" *New York Times*, JULY 23, 2012
- Nate Jones, "['Neither Confirm Nor Deny': The History of the Glomar Response and the Glomar Explorer.](#)" Unredacted. February 11, 2014.
- Steven Aftergood, "[CIA Can Selectively Disclose Information, Court Affirms.](#)" *Secrecy News*, July 3, 2019.
- Malcolm Byrne, "[CIA Admits It Was Behind Iran's Coup.](#)" *Foreign Policy*, August 19, 2013.
- "[Japan Confirms Secret Pact on US Nuclear Transit.](#)" *BBC News*, March 9, 2010.
- Esther B. Fein, "[Soviets Confirm Nazi Pacts Dividing Europe.](#)" *New York Times* August 19, 1989.

Supplemental reading

Cormac, Rory, and Richard J. Aldrich. "Grey is the New Black: Covert Action and Implausible Deniability." *International Affairs* 94.3 (2018): 477-494.

Carnegie, Allison, and Austin Carson. "The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations." *American Journal of Political Science* 63.2 (2019): 269-285.

Carnegie, Allison, and Austin Carson. "The Spotlight's Harsh Glare: Rethinking Publicity and International Order." *International Organization* 72.3 (2018): 627-657.

Riemer, Ofek and Daniel Sobelman. "Coercive Disclosure: Israel's Weaponization Of Intelligence." *War on the Rocks*, August 30, 2019.

Sagar, Rahul. *Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy*. Princeton University Press, 2016.

Week 10 (12/5/19). NO LAB – READING PERIOD

****Final paper due Thursday, Dec 12 by 5 pm****

Send to acarson@uchicago.edu